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UNITED STATES V. HoME CONCRETE & SUPPLY, LLC:
MAKING "AMBIGUOUS" AMBIGUOUS
ABSTRACT
Courts have long given some amount of deference to executive
agencies charged with administering bodies of law. When a statute is
ambiguous, the agency charged with administering the statute may be
better positioned than the courts to interpret it. But when is a statute am-
biguous? How does a modem court determine whether a prior court
thought a statute was ambiguous? Does a Supreme Court interpretation
of an ambiguous statute remove the ambiguity? These are the questions
that faced the Supreme Court in United States v. Home Concrete & Sup-
ply, LLC.
The 1984 Supreme Court decision Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, Inc. ushered in a new era of increased defer-
ence to agencies by replacing the previous circumstantial standard with a
presumption of deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous stat-
utes. Chevron's policy was obvious but its limits were vague. In United
States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court drew a procedural line beyond
which deference to agencies was inappropriate in order to ensure due
process. National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Inter-
net Services made administrative law more consistent by giving Chevron
deference to all proper agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, re-
gardless of whether courts had already interpreted those statutes. Home
Concrete is the Supreme Court's most recent effort to adjust the standard
for Chevron deference.
This Comment analyzes Home Concrete on two levels: (1) by re-
viewing the case-specific issues that primarily controlled Home Con-
crete, and (2) by considering the decision's broader effects on adminis-
trative-deference law. The Comment suggests that the Supreme Court
wrongly decided -ome Concrete on the micro-level and unwisely re-
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INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
source Defense Council, Inc.' held that courts should defer to an agen-
cy's interpretation of a law it administers when (1) Congress was silent
or ambiguous on the issue, and (2) the agency interpretation is reasona-
ble.2 This presumptively deferential approach stood in stark contrast to
the traditional circumstantial analysis of Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 3
In United States v. Mead Corp. , however, the Supreme Court nar-
rowed the Chevron analysis, limiting application only to those circum-
stances where Congress intended to allow agencies to resolve statutory
ambiguities with the force of law.s Where Congress had delegated such
authority to agencies, National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Services recognized that agencies were entitled to
Chevron deference even in the face of a conflicting appellate court deci-
sion.7 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC' is the Supreme
Court's most recent effort to revise administrative-deference law, in
which a plurality of Justices redefined what constitutes "ambiguous"
congressional intent.9
This Comment explores the flaws of Home Concrete and frames the
case as a retreat from the deferential doctrine of Chevron and Brand X.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See id. at 842-45.
3. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
4. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
5. Id at 226-27 (holding that "Chevron deference" applies only "when it appears that Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency" to interpret with the force of law and the agency interpreta-
tion was an "exercise of that authority").
6. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
7. Id. at 982 (holding that an agency interpretation "otherwise entitled to Chevron deference"
trumps a prior judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
8. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
9. See id. at 1843-44 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that congressional intent is only ambig-
uous when Congress "left a gap to fill").
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Part I of this Comment briefly describes the history of Supreme Court
administrative-deference jurisprudence. Part II summarizes the facts,
procedural history, and opinions of Home Concrete. Part III criticizes
Home Concrete for unnecessarily confusing Brand X application, desta-
bilizing the meaning of "ambiguity" in the context of Chevron, and fail-
ing to address two administrative-deference issues that have vexed lower
courts. This Comment concludes that Home Concrete was wrongly de-
cided and will negatively affect administrative-deference law going for-
ward.
I. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has long recognized the need for deference to
executive agencies on interpretations of laws administered by those same
agencies.'o Prior to the landmark Chevron ruling, courts applied a case-
by-case analysis as prescribed by Skidmore to determine proper defer-
ence," varying the range and weight of factors considered.12 Enactment
of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) reduced this vari-
ance by articulating the procedures by which agencies could make and
interpret rules, though it did not directly address the judicial framework
for deference.' 3
Chevron brought a sweeping change with its two-step framework,
creating a presumption of deference to the administering agency when a
statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation is reasonable.14 The
Court subsequently sought to clarify when Chevron applies in Mead,15
though the clarity of that holding is debated.16 Later, Brand X controver-
sially extended Chevron deference to agency interpretations that directly
contradicted prior judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes.' 7 More
recently, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United
States'8 made clear that Chevron applies to Treasury regulations.' 9
10. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to
administrative interpretations.").
11. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989) (discussing pre-Chevron statute-by-statute analysis).
12. See Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over "Fighting Regs" and Judicial Deference in Tax
Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643, 649-60 (2012) (describing variations of factors considered over the
history of tax law deference).
13. Id at 649-50, 653-56, 658 (describing the APA and its effects on tax-law deference).
14. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
15. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
16. Id. at 240-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for creating uncertainty by
abandoning Chevron's presumption of delegation for a requirement of affirmative legislative intent
to delegate).
17. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
18. 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
19. Id. at 713 (rejecting a subject-specific deference standard and adopting the more general
Chevron standard for tax law). The Court also rejected the concept that deference varied based on
whether the grant of authority to the agency was general or specific. Id. at 713-14.
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A. Skidmore and Early Approaches to Administrative Deference
In the 1944 Skidmore case, the Supreme Court recognized that
agency interpretations may be worthy of significant persuasive weight
though they "lack[] power to control." 20 In Skidmore, plaintiffs brought
suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 seeking overtime and
associated damages for nights spent on call in the company fire hall.21
The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division had previously put
forth his view that "the problems presented by inactive duty require a
22flexible solution" depending on the circumstances.22 In Skidmore, the
Administrator filed a brief amicus curiae explaining that his policies
"point[ed] to the exclusion of sleeping and eating time of these employ-
ees from the work-week and the inclusion of all other on-call time."23
However, the trial court denied the employees any recovery by ruling as
a matter of law that waiting time is not work, and the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed.24
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that
weight should be given to agency interpretations based on a non-
exclusive set of factors and that standards of agencies and courts should
differ "only where justified by very good reasons." 25 The Court reasoned
that agency interpretations deserve persuasive weight because agencies
have specialized experience and breadth of knowledge in their respective
fields and because agencies determine the policy that guides enforce-
ment.2 6 The factors affecting the weight given to an agency interpreta-
tion, the Court concluded, should include its thoroughness, reasoning,
and consistency with other pronouncements.27
For the next forty years, courts generally applied some version of
the Skidmore case-by-case approach to agency deference while also con-
sidering guidance from the APA.28 In addition to the Skidmore factors,
courts gauged their deference based on whether an interpretation was
legislative or interpretative,2 9 whether the interpretation was triggered by
litigation,3 0 whether the regulation incorporated common law concepts,
20. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
21. Id at 135.
22. Id at 138.
23. Id at 139.
24. Id at 136.
25. Id at 140.
26. Id at 139-40.
27. Id. at 140.
28. See Scalia, supra note 11.
29. See Lederman, supra note 12, at 649-54 (explaining that interpretive rules received less
deference than legislative rules both before and after the 1946 enactment of the APA).
30. See id at 675-78 (explaining that courts prior to Chevron were "concern[ed] about regula-
tions promulgated during litigation").
31. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review ofAgency Decisions,
104 Nw. U. L. REv. 799, 806-13 (2010) (explaining the problem of deferring to agency interpreta-
tions of statutes that include common law phrases, arguably well within the judiciary's proper do-
main).
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which agency made the interpretation, 32 and whether congressional dele-
gation to the agency was general or specific. 3 3
B. Modern Administrative Deference: Chevron
The Chevron Court announced a new standard for administrative
deference based on a presumption that Congress intended to delegate
interpretation to the administering agency when Congress's intent on the
specific matter was not directly expressed.34 In Chevron, the National
Resources Defense Council filed a petition in the D.C. Circuit for review
of an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation that defined
the term "stationary source" from the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977.35 At issue was whether stationary source of pollution in the Clean
Air Act permit program referred to a facility as a whole (the "plant-wide"
definition) or to each individual polluting device in a facility. The EPA
under Reagan had issued regulations establishing the plant-wide defini-
tion, reversing course from the EPA under Carter.37 Despite observing
that Congress's intent regarding the definition was ambiguous, the D.C.
Circuit set aside the regulations because it found the plant-wide defini-
tion inconsistent with the purpose of the program.38
The Chevron Court granted certiorari and reversed, deferring to the
EPA's plant-wide definition because Congress was silent on the issue
and the plant-wide definition was reasonable. 3 9 The holding established a
two-step test requiring deference to an agency's construction of a statute
the agency administers when (1) Congress has not "directly spoken to the
precise question at issue" and (2) the agency's view is reasonable. 40 Fur-
thermore, the new standard applied whether Congress left a gap unfilled
either intentionally or inadvertently.4 1 The Court stressed agencies' polit-
ical accountability and expertise as reasons for this broad deference and
rejected the notion that an agency's change in interpretation over time
precluded deference.42
32. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712-13
(2011) (noting the Treasury-specific standard of Nat '1 Muffler Dealers Ass' v. United States, 440
U.S. 472 (1978)).
33. Lederman, supra note 12, at 656 ("Prior to the APA, there was an understanding specific
to tax law that general-authority regulations were interpretive and that specific-authority regulations
were legislative.").
34. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
35. Id. at 840-41.
36. Id
37. Id. at 853, 857-58.
38. Id at 841-42.
39. Id. at 862, 866.
40. Id at 842-43, 845.
41. Id at 865-66.
42. Id. at 863-66.
DENVER UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW
C. Mead Limits Chevron "Step Zero-'
Mead pulled back from Chevron's broad standard, limiting applica-
tion of Chevron deference to situations where Congress has shown intent
to grant agency authority to make rules with the force of law and the
interpretation in question is an exercise of that authority." In Mead, the
plaintiff challenged a Customs Headquarters ruling that reclassified its
three-ring binders as diaries, subjecting them to a tariff.4 5 The Court of
Intemational Trade granted summary judgment to the government with-
out addressing deference.4 6 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
Customs rulings should not receive Chevron deference because they are
not subject to notice-and-comment procedures under the APA and do not
apply beyond the specific case.47
Affirming this limitation, the Supreme Court held that classification
rulings were not subject to Chevron deference because they were not an
exercise of authority delegated by Congress to make rules with the force
of law. The Court reasoned that because classification rulings are case-
specific and are "being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at ... 46
scattered offices," such rulings are so informal that Congress could not
have intended for them to carry the force of law.48 Rather than presuming
delegation, the Court required indications of legislative delegation such
as express authorization of rulemaking or authority to use formal proce-
dures more worthy of the force of law.49 Additionally, when Chevron
deference is not merited, the Court noted, an agency interpretation may
still be persuasive under Skidmore.so
In lone dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's "avulsive"
change as abandoning Chevron's clear presumption of agency authori-
ty.51 Further, he emphasized that the majority ruling was unfaithful to the
policies behind Chevron and would lead to uncertainty and ossification
of previously flexible administered laws.52
43. Pojanowski, supra note 31, at 803 ("Much of the copious ink spilt over Chevron, howev-
er, runs toward Chevron's so-called 'Step Zero'-the threshold determination about which agency
interpretations should be eligible for the two-step inquiry.").
44. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
45. Id at 225.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 225-26.
48. Id. at 232-34.
49. Id at 229-30.
50. See id at 234.
51. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 241-42, 244-45, 247-49 (conceding that ossification of administered laws could be
remedied by allowing agencies to readopt their interpretation through an approved procedure follow-
ing a contrary judicial ruling, but rejecting that concept as a "landmark abdication of judicial pow-
er").
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D. Brand X Extends Chevron
Although Mead limited the applicability of Chevron deference, the
Supreme Court in Brand X broadened the reach of such deference when
it did apply.53 Where Congress left an ambiguity in a statute for determi-
nation by an agency, the agency interpretation was entitled to deference
even when conflicting with a prior judicial interpretation.54 After Brand
X, "[o]nly a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously
forecloses the agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no -gap for
the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction."
In BrandX, digital-subscriber-line (DSL) broadband providers chal-
lenged the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) classification of
cable broadband services as information services instead of telecommu-
nications services, thus allowing cable companies to avoid mandatory
common-carrier regulations that burdened DSL companies. 6 The Ninth
Circuit vacated the classification and remanded on principles of stare
decisis because it had previously held that cable broadband was a tele-
communications service.57
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that
Congress's intent for the meaning of the terms "telecommunications ser-
vice" and "information service" was ambiguous and the FCC's formal
classification of cable broadband providers as information services was
reasonable. The majority reasoned that a court's interpretation of an
ambiguous statute should not bind an agency just because the court's
ruling happened to come first, noting that to hold otherwise would lead
to ossification of administered law. 5 9 Dissenting again, Justice Scalia
warned that the holding made "judicial decisions subject to reversal by
executive officers." 6 0
II. UNITED STATES V. HOME CONCRETE & SUPPLY, LLC
A. Facts
Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a),61 the statute of limitations for the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to assess income taxes is generally three
years, but that period is extended to six years by 26 U.S.C.
§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) when the taxpayer "omits from gross income an
amount properly includible therein [which] is in excess of 25 percent of
53. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 982 83.
56. Id. at 975-80.
57. Id. at 979-80.
58. Id at 989, 1000-01, 1003.
59. Id. at 983.
60. Id at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) (2006).
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the amount of gross income stated in the return." 6 2 In its 1999 tax return,
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC listed income from the sale of certain
property but overstated the basis for that property resulting in an under-
statement of income greater than the statute's 25% threshold. 63 The IRS
assessed this deficiency after the three-year period but before the six-year
period.6
Section 6501 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in 1954.
A provision materially identical to § 6501 existed in the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939.66 However, the 1954 version contains two subsections
not present in the 1939 version, one of which defines "gross income" for
a trade or business as the total received from the sale of goods or services
prior to the diminution of the cost. 67 The 1954 Code also made an estate-
tax-omission rule, but that version used the phrase "omits . .. items" 68 as
opposed to the phrase "omi[ts] . . . amount" in the income-tax-omission
rule.69
In 1958, the Supreme Court decided Colony, Inc. v. Commission-
er,7 0 which addressed the issue at play in Home Concrete: whether an
overstatement of basis resulting in an understatement of income consti-
tuted an omission of an amount from gross income.7 1 Although the 1954
Code was already enacted at the time of Colony, the 1939 Code applied
in Colony because the income in question was from 1946 and 1947.72
The Court held that an overstatement of basis did not constitute an oms-
sion for purposes of the 1939 version,73 but it observed that the new 1954
version "resolved [this issue] for the future" 74 with "unambiguous lan-
guage."75 Though noting that the language of the 1939 provision was not
14 76"unambiguous" on the issue, the Court found in the legislative history
"persuasive indications" that Congress intended application only for
omission of entire items, rather than for all understatements of income.7 7
In making its holding, the Court inferred that Congress's purpose was to
62. Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i).
63. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1839 (2012).
64. Id
65. Id. at 1840.
66. Id. ("The Code provision applicable to this case, adopted in 1954, contains materially
indistinguishable language [to the 1939 code]." (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A))).
67. Id. at 1841 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)).
68. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(2).
69. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1851 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
70. 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
71. Id. at 29-30.
72. Id. at 30.
73. Id. at 36.
74. Id. at 32.
75. Id. at 37.
76. Id. at 33.
77. Id. at 35.
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prevent the IRS from being disadvantaged at detecting errors by the ab-
sence of an item.78
B. Procedural History
Home Concrete brought suit in the Eastern District of North Caroli-
na, seeking to recover taxes it had paid based on an adjustment that was
issued after the default three-year period expired.7 9 The district court
granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding the taxpayer's under-
statement of income resulting from its basis overstatement to be an omis-
sion of gross income that triggered the extended six-year statute of limi-
tations.so
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that, per Colony, an
understatement of income resulting from overstatement of basis is not an
omission from gross income. 8' The court was not persuaded that the ad-
ditional subsections in the 1954 Code altered the meaning of the control-
ling provision. 82 The IRS also argued that Treasury Regulation
301.6501(e)-i, finalized in 2010, overturned Colony by expressly includ-
ing understatements of income resulting from overstatements of basis as
omissions from income, and the regulation should have been applied
retroactively in Home Concrete because the case was not finally re-
solved.83 The court rejected this argument, holding that the regulation
could not be applied retroactively and, further, that Colony could not be
overturned because it resolved an unambiguous statute.8 4 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the three-year or the six-
year statute of limitations should apply.85
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia. 86 The majority
affirmed, holding that the six-year statute of limitations did not apply on
the grounds of stare decisis.87 Colony controlled because its Court deter-
mined the intent of Congress in the 1939 Code and because there was no
clear indication that Congress had changed the treatment of overstate-
ments in relation to income omissions in the 1954 Code.88 A plurality
78. Id. at 36. This stated purpose was not clear from the legislative history but rather from
what the Court thought Congress manifested. See id
79. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 252-53 (4th Cir. 2011),
aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
80. Id. at 253.
81. Id. at258.
82. Id. at 255.
83. Id. at 255-56.
84. Id. at 257-58.
85. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1839 (2012).
86. Id. at 1838.
87. Id. at 1844.
88. Id. at 1841.
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went on to clarify that the 2010 Treasury Department regulation could
not overturn Colony because Brand X only applied when Congress "left a
gap to fill."89 Justice Scalia declined to join that portion of the opinion,
suggesting instead that BrandX should be abandoned. 90
The majority began by summarizing Colony and then proceeded to
dismiss the dissent's reasons that the changes in the 1954 Code affected
the overstatement-of-basis issue.91 First, the Court reasoned that there
were potential congressional motives for adding the new subsections to
§ 6501(e)(1)(A) beyond changing the general rule on overstatements of
basis. 9 2 Second, the addition of the phrase "omits ... items" to the estate-
tax-omissions rule did not have sufficient strength to overturn Colony's
careful interpretation of the phrase "omits . . . amount" in the income-
tax-omissions rule.
In considering whether the IRS regulations overturned Colony, Jus-
tice Breyer's plurality found that the decision left no room for agency
interpretation. 9 4 Although acknowledging that ambiguous language con-
stituted "at least a presumptive indication that Congress did delegate ...
gap-filling-authority" to an agency, Justice Breyer disregarded the Colo-
ny Court's characterization of the statute as ambiguous. 95 Justice Breyer
pointed to the Colony Court's use of legislative history, characterization
of the taxpayer's argument as the "better side of the textual [analysis]," 96
and observation that ruling for the government would result in a "patent
incongruity in the tax law."97 As a result, finding "every reason to be-
lieve that the [Colony] Court thought that Congress had 'directly spoken
to the question at hand,' and thus left '[no] gap for the agency to fill,," 9 8
the Court concluded that Brand X did not apply; therefore Colony's in-
terpretation was binding.99
D. Concurring Opinion
Concurring in part and in the judgment, Justice Scalia renewed his
staunch objection to Brand X 00 In doing so, Justice Scalia underscored
the impracticality of trying to determine whether a pre-Chevron Court, to
89. Id. at 1844 (plurality opinion).
90. Id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. Id at 1839-42 (majority opinion).
92. Id
93. Id
94. Id at 1843 (plurality opinion).
95. Id Colony stated, "[LIt cannot be said that the language is unambiguous." Colony, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958).
96. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844. Colony stated, "[W]e are inclined to think that the
statute on its face lends itself more plausibly to the taxpayer's interpretation." Colony, 357 U.S. at
33.
97. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (citing Colony, 357 U.S. at 33, 35-37).
98. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1846 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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whom the label "ambiguous" had no relevance, thought a statute was
ambiguous.101 Assuming, arguendo, the validity of BrandX, he criticized
the majority's gap-to-fill requirement as unnecessarily 02 confusing ad-
ministrative-deference law "yet again."10 3 Citing the vague references to
congressional intent from Colony, Justice Scalia explained that in this
case congressional intent was still very much ambiguous and thus the
majority should have found that Brand X applied.'
E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, explained that the changes to the 1954 Code
made the already ambiguous exclusion of overstatements of basis'05 even
more ambiguous,106 thereby effectively making § 6501 a new statute
subject to Chevron and not controlled by Colony.10 7 Without the need to
deal with Colony, the analysis in BrandXhad no bearing on the decision,
so the Treasury was free to adopt its own interpretation. 08
Justice Kennedy enumerated the additions to the 1954 version that
indicated congressional intent to include basis overstatements in income-
tax omissions. First, the addition of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) expressly exclud-
ed overstatements of basis from omissions of income in special circum-
stances, implying that the general rule included overstatements.' 09 Sec-
ond, the continued use of the word "amount" for income-tax omissions
despite the deliberate use of the word "items" for estate-tax omissions
implied that income-tax omissions did not just apply to entire items." 0
Additionally, the dissent stressed that Colony "never purported to inter-
pret" the 1954 version."'
Because the IRS's interpretation of § 6501 was at least reasonable,
perhaps even the best interpretation, the dissent concluded that such in-
terpretation deserved deference. 12 The dissent declined to suggest that
101. Id. at 1846-48.
102. Id at 1847 (observing other more appropriate means of protecting taxpayers' justified
reliance).
103. Id. (referring to criticism of United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)); see also
supra Part LC (describing Justice Scalia's dissent in Mead).
104. Home Concrete, 123 S. Ct. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 1849 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting Colony's description of the 1939 language as
ambiguous).
106. Id ("Although the main text of the statute remained the same, Congress added new provi-
sions leading to the permissible conclusion that it would have a different meaning going forward.").
107. Id at 1851.
108. Id. at 1852 ("The Treasury Department's regulations were promulgated in light of [the
1954] revisions, which were not at issue in Colony.").
109. Id. at 1850-51.
110. Id. at 1851.
I11. Id at 1852-53 (quoting Intermountain Ins. Serv. v. Comm'r, 650 F.3d 691, 705-06 (D.C.
Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id
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the 2010 Treasury Department regulation overturned Colony under
BrandX, dismissing such an issue as "not implicated here.",l 3
III. ANALYSIS
The Home Concrete majority erred by holding, in the face of com-
pelling contrary evidence, that Colony's interpretation of the 1939 tax
code applied to the 1954 tax code. The plurality followed by misapplying
Brand X in several significant ways. First, the plurality chose a difficult
hypothetical-based test for Brand X applicability that will generate un-
predictable results in administrative-deference cases. Second, the plurali-
ty blurred the meaning of ambiguity in a shift away from the deferential
approach of Chevron and BrandX. Third, the Court missed an opportuni-
ty to address two unresolved issues in administrative law: (1) Brand X
applicability to prior Supreme Court interpretations, and (2) whether
agencies should be able to reverse litigation by creating new interpreta-
tions after the litigation and retroactively applying those interpretations
to individuals to whom the courts have already given relief.
A. Home Concrete Improperly Applied Colony to a New Statute
The Colony Court never intended that its interpretation of the 1939
tax code apply to the 1954 tax code. Congress's intent to include over-
statements of basis in income omissions in the 1954 version is apparent
from the statutory text, the context in which the 1954 version was writ-
ten, and the Colony Court's comments in recognition of that intent. Nev-
ertheless, the Home Concrete majority found otherwise, impractically
assigning itself a Brand X analysis and reopening a tax loophole that
Congress closed in 1954.
As the Home Concrete dissent explained, Congress made several
textual additions to the 1954 tax code indicating that overstatements of
basis should be included in omissions from income.l 14 First, Congress
added two subsections to the income-omissions provision, one expressly
announcing that overstatements of basis do not count as omissions in the
particular case of trade or business.
In the case of a trade or business, the term "gross income" means
the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or
services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) pri-
or to diminution by the cost of such sales or services ... .1
The dissent reasoned that this exception for goods sold by businesses
excluding overstatements of basis implied that the general rule included
113. Id at 1851-52.
114. Id at 1849-51.
115. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
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overstatements. 116 The majority maintained that Congress "could well
have" intended only to specify the overstatement rule for sale of goods
by businesses, leaving the general rule to be decided by the courts.117 It
also noted that the subsection had an additional reasonable purpose unre-
lated to overstatements of basis.1 8
Second, Congress used the language "omits... items" in the estate-
tax-omissions provision, but used the language "omits .. . amount" in the
income-tax-omissions provision.' These provisions serve identical pur-
poses for two different types of tax, are phrased in otherwise very similar
language, and are adjacent subsections of the same tax-code section.120
The dissent suggested that this distinction shows deliberate congressional
intent to include overstatements for income-tax omissions but not for
estate-tax omissions.121 The majority conceded that the language was
new, but belittled the change as insufficient proof of congressional in-
tent.122
The majority's reasoning manifests its error: it should have been re-
viewing the textual changes for an introduction of ambiguity, not for a
change in the best interpretation. By noting that "one plausible reason
why Congress might have added clause (i)" is that Congress "could well
have" intended something else, the majority conceded that the new text is
ambiguous.123 Such ambiguity should have triggered a new Chevron
analysis, rendering Colony irrelevant.
The context of the writing of the 1954 Code also supports a finding
of congressional intent to change the overstatement issue. Preceding the
new tax code, federal circuits were split on the overstatement issue re-
garding the 1939 version; Congress had a motive to resolve this issue in
the 1954 version. 12 4 Congress could not have intended, through silence,
"to convey an established meaning from prior judicial and regulatory
interpretations" because there was no established meaning.125
116. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1851 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The revised statute's
special treatment of these costs suggests that overstatements of basis in other cases could have the
effect of extending the limitations period.").
117. Id. at 1841 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 1841-42.
119. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(2), with § 6501(e)(1)(A).
120. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (extending the statute of limitations for assessing
income taxes when there are omissions in income), with § 6501 (e)(2) (extending the statute of limi-
tations for assessing estate taxes when there are omissions in inheritance income).
121. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1851 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1842 (majority opinion) ("But to rely in the case before us on this solitary word
change in a different subsection is like hoping that a new batboy will change the outcome of the
World Series.").
123. Id. at 1841 (emphasis added).
124. Russell R. Young, D.C. Circuit in Intermountain Sets Stage for Supreme Court Consid-
eration of Home Concrete, 116 J. TAX'N 33, 36 (2012).
125. Id.
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The Court in Colony noted the circuit split on the issue and recog-
nized that Congress had resolved the issue for the future with the 1954
Code.126 The Court believed that Congress had addressed the issue and
changed it in the text; this is evident from its contrasting descriptions of
the two versions. The Court noted that "it cannot be said that the [1939]
language is unambiguous," 27 but maintained that its ruling was "in har-
mony with the unambiguous language of [the 1954 Code]." 28
Aside from being textually and contextually unsupportable, the ma-
jority's refusal to interpret the 1954 statute under Chevron is neither jus-
tified by policy nor practical. Stare decisis is a non-issue; the new inter-
pretation would be of a different statute so it would not conflict with
Colony. Protecting taxpayer expectations here is unnecessary; expecta-
tions are sufficiently protected by the processes required by Mead,12 9 the
reasonableness standard of Chevron,' 30 and the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of the APA.131 Judicial efficiency as a basis also falls flat.
Spending time conducting a Chevron analysis of the statute is not waste-
ful because the alternative is spending time conducting a Brand X analy-
sis of the prior judicial construction.
Holding that the 1954 Code did not affect the overstatement issue
was poorly reasoned and unjustified. Taxpayers who underpay taxes by
overstating bases for sales, whether intentionally or not, will benefit at
the expense of all other taxpayers. Congress, which has already ad-
dressed the issue once, will have to spend time resolving it once again in
order to correct the Court's error.
B. The Plurality's Implementation of the Brand X Test Unnecessarily
Creates Uncertainty
The Home Concrete plurality put forth a daunting test for Brand X
applicability to pre-Chevron judicial interpretations-Would the prior
court have found that Congress's intent was unambiguous by Chevron
standards if it had considered the issue? The plurality selected this test
126. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1958) ("We granted certiorari because this
decision conflicted with rulings in other Courts of Appeals on the same issue, and because the ques-
tion as to the proper scope of [the 1939 Code], although resolved for the future by [the 1954 Code],
remains one of substantial importance in the administration of the income-tax laws for earlier taxable
years." (citations omitted)).
127. Id.at33.
128. Id. at 37.
129. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead has Muddled Judicial Review ofAgency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1478-81 (2005) (describing the protections offered to individuals by notice-
and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication).
130. Note, Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step One Holding?, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1532, 1551 (2006) ("Under the [Chevron] doctrine of hard look review, courts can block change if
the agency has not rationally considered, weighed, and addressed the reliance interests of regulated
parties.").
131. See Lederman, supra note 12, at 697 (suggesting that Treasury Department "fighting
regulations"-those created for the purpose of affecting ongoing litigation by changing the law
retroactively-should be dealt with using the arbitrary and capricious check).
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over the more practical "if necessary" test suggested by Brand X.132 This
decision will result in a standard that is difficult to follow for courts, and
it will lead to uncertainty and unpredictability for agencies that adminis-
ter laws and for individuals governed by them.133
The difficulty presented by Brand X is predominantly limited to
cases decided before Chevron. After Chevron, most courts knew to make
their decisions clear by uttering the "magic words" that their "construc-
tion follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute" and citing Brand
X.134 Pre-Chevron courts, like Colony, however, pose more of a dilemma.
These courts had no reason to determine whether congressional intent
was clear enough to merit the Chevron "unambiguous" label.'35 Instead,
pre-Chevron courts only needed to determine what was most likely Con-
gress's intent. These courts interpreted administered statutes virtually the
same as they interpreted any other statute: with a de novo review to de-
termine the best interpretation.'36
This was the question facing Home Concrete-How should a court
best determine whether a pre-Chevron court held that its interpretation is
the only one permissible, when that court had no reason to make that
holding? The plurality answered that a court should take its best guess at
what the prior court would have done, hypothetically, had it considered
the Chevron question.'37 A better answer is that a court should never try
to make such a determination. Rather, a court should find that a pre-
Chevron decision held that the statute was unambiguous only "if [it was]
necessary"' 3 8 to do so, such as when the prior court applied some "other
132. See Note, supra note 130, at 1540 ("The [if necessary] test finds a Step One holding when
the previous court, due to another interpretive doctrine (the rule of lenity, a clear statement rule, the
canon of avoidance, etc.), could have reached the result it did only by holding that its interpretation
was the only reasonable one."). The Court suggested this test in Brand X. Id. at 1540-42; Nat'l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) ("A court's prior
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron defer-
ence only if the prior decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the
statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion." (emphasis added)).
133. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1847 (2012) (Scal-
ia, J., concurring) ("[T]he plurality ... revisles] . . . the meaning of Chevron ... in a direction that
will create confusion and uncertainty.").
134. Note, supra note 130, at 1537. Courts between Chevron and BrandX would have instead
used Chevron's "magic words" and cited Chevron, except for those with no agency interpretation to
defer to. See id. at 1537-38.
135. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1846 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Indeed, the Court was
unaware of even the utility (much less the necessity) of making the ambiguous/nonambiguous de-
termination in cases decided pre-Chevron.").
136. Doug Geyser, Courts Still "Say What the Law is": Explaining the Functions of the Judi-
ciary and Agencies After Brand X, 106 CoLUM. L. REv. 2129, 2129 (2006) (noting that "precedent
had only supplied a 'best' meaning").
137. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (plurality opinion). The plurality gave this answer
by example; it considered the entire text of the Colony opinion, which did not require a holding that
the statute left no gap to fill, and found that "the opinion ... makes clear that it did not [leave a gap
to fill]." Id.
138. See Note, supra note 130, at 1540 (explaining the if necessary test).
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rule of construction (such as the rule of lenity) requiring it to conclude
that the statute was unambiguous to reach its judgment." 1
3 9
The plurality's choice of this hypothetical-Chevron test over the if
necessary test is impracticall 40 and lacks support in Brand X.14' Aside
from the plain difficulty of surmising a prior court's beliefs on an issue
from language written for a different purpose, this textual-review exer-
cise has other less obvious pitfalls. "[L]abels like 'clear' and 'ambigu-
ous' took on new meaning after Chevron," 4 2 but prior courts may have
used them more casually when they just colored dicta and lacked this
heightened significance.14 3 The presence of the labels could mean every-
thing or nothing, as could their absence. Tellingly, the Home Concrete
plurality itself had to deal with this precise issue in order to reach its
holding.'"
The text of Brand X supports a clearer, more practical test.14 5 The
Court only required a determination of whether the earlier interpretation
was the "only permissible reading of the statute." 4 6 In addition, Brand X
at least implied that dicta should not factor into the test.147 Moreover, in
applying its own principles to its case at hand, Brand X did not recite the
prior court's findings to fish for indications of the answer to a hypothet-
ical question,14 8 but rather simply noted that no rule of construction had
forced the prior court's holding.149
In applying the test, the Home Concrete plurality provided no clear
guidance. Justice Breyer purported to rely on Colony's use of the "tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction" to ascertain the intention of Con-
139. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985 (2005).
140. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1846-47 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("For many of those earlier
cases, therefore, it will be incredibly difficult to determine whether the decision purported to be
giving meaning to an ambiguous, or rather an unambiguous, statute.").
141. See Note, supra note 130, at 1540-42 (considering the support provided by Brand X for
each type of test).
142. Id. at 1537.
143. Id. at 1537-38 ("[C]ourts were probably less cautious in calling statutes 'clear' when it
did nothing other than sway readers impressed by adjectives."); see also Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct.
at 1846 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In cases decided pre-BrandX, the Court had no inkling that it must
utter the magic words 'ambiguous' or 'unambiguous' in order to (poof1) expand or abridge executive
power, and (poot.) enable or disable administrative contradiction of the Supreme Court.").
144. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (plurality opinion) ("As the Government points out,
the Court in Colony stated that the statutory language at issue is not 'unambiguous.' But the Court
decided that case nearly 30 years before it decided Chevron. There is no reason to believe the lin-
guistic ambiguity noted by Colony reflects a post-Chevron conclusion that Congress had delegated
gap-filling power to the agency." (citations omitted)).
145. Note, supra note 130, at 1540-42 (considering the support provided by Brand X for each
type of test).
146. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984 (2005).
147. See Note, supra note 130, at 1540-42 (noting that the BrandXCourt focused on "what the
precedent did and did not hold" (citing BrandX, 545 U.S. at 983-86)).
148. Id. at 1540-41 ("Brand X contains very little of the play-by-play analysis one would
expect of a court applying [the hypothetical-Chevron] standard."). The Court did, however, cite the
prior court's full analysis. See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 984.
149. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 985.
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gress in determining the meaning of the statute.' 50 As Justice Scalia not-
ed, however, "[T]hese are the sorts of arguments that courts always use
in resolving ambiguities." '5 The plurality even conceded, "It may be that
judges today would use other methods to determine whether Congress
left a gap to fill."l 52
When it chose the hypothetical-Chevron test, the plurality suggested
a standard that lower courts will be unable to follow with any consisten-
cy. The if necessary test would have been far easier to apply and is fa-
vored by BrandX. The plurality's decision will result in protracted con-
fusion and uncertainty about "what the law is" for both agencies and
governed individuals.
C. Home Concrete Abandons Chevron's Presumption ofAmbiguity
By finding unambiguous congressional intent in Colony's review of
vague bits of legislative history,15 3 the Home Concrete plurality danger-
ously damaged Chevron's clear deferential standard that ambiguity exists
where congressional intent on the issue is not clear. 5 4 To do so, the plu-
rality reversed Chevron's presumption of ambiguity, thus reducing def-
erence and departing from Chevron's wise policy.
In Home Concrete, the plurality searched the text of Colony to de-
termine whether the Colony Court would have found congressional intent
to be unambiguous if it had considered the issue. 1s The plurality ob-
served that the Colony Court (1) believed "the taxpayer had the better
side of the textual argument," (2) found "'persuasive indications' that
Congress intended overstatements of basis to fall outside the statute's
scope," and (3) thought the IRS interpretation "would 'create a patent
incongruity in the tax law."'l 56 However, the plurality inferred from these
observations that the Colony Court "thought that Congress had 'directly
spoken to the question at hand.'""5
This inference involved a logical leap that is inconsistent with
Chevron. Chevron's instruction was that ambiguity exists where Con-
150. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984)).
151. Id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 1844 (plurality opinion).
153. See id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting paucity of evidence from Colony on which
the plurality found unambiguous congressional intent to exclude overstatements of basis from the
provision).
154. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.").
155. See supra Part Il.B (referring to the hypothetical-Chevron test applied by the plurality).
156. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844 (plurality opinion) (citing Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r,
357 U.S. 28, 33, 35-36, 37 (1958)).
157. Id (emphasis added) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
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gress had not "directly spoken to the precise question at issue."' 58 This
instruction was written in terms of a requirement for unambiguity (i.e.,
clear congressional intent), effectively creating a presumption of ambigu-
ity. Absent an affirmative showing that Congress clearly had an intention
on the issue, ambiguity exists. So how did the plurality find unambigu-
ous intent in Colony's remarks about Congress's indirect statements? It
reversed Chevron's presumption of ambiguity.' 59
Rather than overturn revered Chevron by announcing this reversal
overtly, the plurality effectively accomplished this by subtly shifting the
language of the longstanding Chevron test from a positive to a negative.
Where Chevron found ambiguity absent an affirmative showing that
Congress "directly spoke[] to the precise question at issue,"'60 the Home
Concrete plurality found unambiguity absent an affirmative showing that
Congress "left a gap to fill."' 61 The phrase "left a gap to fill" is not a
Home Concrete creation; it was used in both Chevron'62 and Brand X, 3
where, admittedly, it described what Congress must have done before an
agency interpretation could fill that gap. However, Chevron'6 and Brand
Y 65 made plain that finding Congress left a gap to fill was a conclusion
reached by a court after failing to find that Congress had directly spoken
to the issue. The Home Concrete plurality put the cart before the horse
when it concluded that Congress had "directly spoken to the question at
issue" by failing to find that Congress "left a gap to fill."
To require an affirmative finding that Congress "left a gap to fill" is
to ignore what a functional definition of "ambiguous" must mean in the
context of Chevron.166 Ambiguity will almost never be found if it is held
158. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
159. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1847 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("But in order to evade Brand
X and yet reaffirm Colony, the plurality would add yet another lopsided story . . .: To trigger the
Brand X power of an authorized 'gap-filling' agency to give content to an ambiguous text, a pre-
Chevron determination that language is ambiguous does not alone suffice; the pre-Chevron Court
must in addition have found that Congress wanted the particular ambiguity in question to be re-
solved by the agency."). Justice Scalia referred to the text itself rather than to legislative history, but
his comments are still accurate when applied to congressional intent.
160. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
161. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1843-44 (plurality opinion) (summarizing Chevron's
"underlying interpretive problem" as deciding when a statute "delegates to an agency the power to
fill a gap").
162. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency . . . .").
163. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83
(2005) ("Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency
construction.").
164. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (noting that a gap may be inferred from an ambiguous
statute).
165. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 982-83 ("[A] judicial precedent holding that the statute unambigu-
ously forecloses the agency's interpretation ... therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill . . .
(emphasis added)).
166. See Scalia, supra note I1, at 520 (discussing the impracticality of a definition of "ambigu-
ous" that only applies to various interpretations that "are in absolute equipoise").
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to mean that alternative interpretations are equally likely, without the
slightest probability that one interpretation is more likely Congress's
intent than the other.'67 Ambiguity must therefore be "when two or more
reasonable, though not necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist." 68
Clearly, Colony found that the taxpayer's interpretation was better than
the IRS interpretation,1 69 but it is not clear at all from Colony that the
Court considered the IRS interpretation unreasonable.
Home Concrete's reversal of Chevron's presumption of ambiguity,
like Mead's reversal of Chevron's presumption of delegation, 70 will
result in less judicial deference to agencies. The Mead Court, though, had
a policy basis for limiting Chevron deference: such limiting guaranteed
that due process would not be compromised when agencies made law in
statutory gaps-that the laws were made with sufficient deliberation,
oversight, and process. '7  The Home Concrete plurality's decision to
limit deference by changing the ambiguity standard goes against Chev-
ron's deferential policies without reason.
Chevron's shift towards administrative deference was based on the
Court's understanding that courts, agencies, and society usually benefit
when agencies that are charged with administering laws are allowed to
fill gaps in those laws. The administrative state is larger than ever now,
and administrative law is frequently complex and subject-specific; 7 2
agencies have expertise in the laws they administer 73 and more resources
than the overburdened courts. 7 4 As part of the Executive Branch, agen-
cies are politically accountable and thus are more properly positioned
than courts to make decisions that involve policy. 175 Perhaps most signif-
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958) ("[W]e are inclined to think that the
statute on its face lends itself more plausibly to the taxpayer's interpretation . . . .").
170. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that Chevron defer-
ence only applies "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency" to interpret with
the force of law and the agency interpretation was an "exercise of that authority").
171. See Bressman, supra note 129, at 1479-80 (explaining that Mead delivered procedural
formalities required by the Constitution "to promote predictable and fair lawmaking").
172. Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the modem "era when federal statu-
tory law administered by federal agencies is pervasive").
173. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (noting
that deference has been given where understanding "has depended upon more than ordinary
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations"); id. at 865 ("Judges are not
experts in the field .... ).
174. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 516-17 (noting the "sheer number" of agencies and the
"sheer volume of modem dockets").
175. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices . . . ."); id. at 866 ("The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial
ones: Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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icantly, agencies require flexibility to execute efficiently the laws they
administer as society and policies change over time.176
Home Concrete will put more policy decisions in the hands of the
less knowledgeable, overburdened, and unaccountable Judiciary. If
courts hold more often to precedent rather than defer to agencies' newer
interpretations, the law will become static and agencies will be robbed of
needed flexibility. 17 7 The traditionally recognized benefit of reducing
agency deference in favor of judicial interpretations is an increase in
stability and predictability that arguably comes from courts' common,
learned methods of analysis and their reliance on precedent.'7 1 Unfortu-
nately, these benefits will not be delivered by Home Concrete's pre-
sumption of unambiguity because it is accompanied by the plurality's
new, unpredictable hypothetical-Chevron test.
When the Home Concrete plurality suggested that a court should
consider a statute unambiguous unless the court affirmatively determines
that Congress "left a gap to fill," it reversed Chevron's presumption of
ambiguity. The costs will include lay interpretations of expert matters,
inefficient allocation of government resources, unaccountable policy
making, and ossification of administered laws. The benefits will be scant.
D. Home Concrete Failed to Answer Open Deference Questions
Home Concrete presented two additional unresolved issues in ad-
ministrative-deference law: (1) whether Brand X allowed agency inter-
pretations to trump prior Supreme Court interpretations, and (2) how
courts should treat retroactive application of litigation-induced interpre-
tations. The Treasury regulation at issue in Home Concrete was induced
by litigation, retroactively applied, and used to trump a prior Supreme
Court interpretation. By conducting a Brand X analysis in Home Con-
crete, the plurality implicitly took these issues up, but it remained silent
on them, leaving lower courts with more questions than answers.
Justice Stevens concurred in Brand X to add the caveat that "[Brand
X's reasoning] would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by this
Court that would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity."179
Home Concrete presented a conflict between an agency interpretation
and a prior Supreme Court interpretation, representing the first time this
issue had come before the Supreme Court since Brand X. However, the
176. Id. at 863-64 ("[T]he agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.").
177. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)
("[P]recluding agencies from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes" "would
'lead to the ossification of large portions of our statutory law."' (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 247
(Scalia, J., dissenting))).
178. See Pojanowski, supra note 31, at 821-31.
179. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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plurality chose not to address the issue directly.' 80 Instead, the plurality
entertained the government's BrandXargument but dismissed it on other
previously mentioned grounds,'8 ' thus allowing an inference of Brand X
applicability to Supreme Court decisions but not making it clear.182 In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that Brand X would have to allow
agency interpretations to trump the Supreme Court's interpretations, by
rejecting Justice Stevens's idea that "an ambiguity resolved is an ambi-
guity that never existed in the first place." 83 The dissent mentioned this
unresolved issue just before indicating that it would not address the gov-
ernment's Brand X argument,184 perhaps revealing its motive for avoid-
ing the argument.
The Court did previously address BrandXapplicability to litigation-
induced regulations,'8 5 but questions have since arisen about the limits of
this application based on concerns for protecting governed individuals'
justified expectations. Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the
Fourth Circuit held in Home Concrete that the government's retroactive
application of the regulation to the taxpayer was an alternative ground
for ruling in favor of the taxpayer.186 However, there is no mention of the
retroactive-application issue in any of the Supreme Court Home Con-
crete opinions.
There are potential explanations for the Court's silence on these is-
sues. By holding on step-one grounds that the agency interpretation did
not trump Colony, the Court was not required to address these additional
potentially constitutional issues, so judicial restraintl87 Suggests its si-
lence was appropriate. Additionally, the Court might have considered the
180. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843-44 (2012)
(plurality opinion) (failing to mention relevance of fact that prior interpretation was made by the
Supreme Court).
181. Id. The previously mentioned grounds are that the Colony Court found congressional
intent unambiguous.
182. One could infer support for the idea that a Supreme Court interpretation resolves ambigui-
ty, thus foreclosing Brand X application, from one majority statement: "In our view, Colony has
already interpreted the statute, and there is no longer any different construction that is consistent
with Colony and available for adoption by the agency." Id. at 1843 (majority opinion). It is more
likely that the Court intended no such inference, but was attempting to phrase a general rejection of
the government's argument in a way that was consistent with both the plurality's Brand X analysis
and Justice Scalia's concurrence.
183. Id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 1851-52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("There has been no opportunity to decide
whether the analysis would be any different if an agency sought to interpret an ambiguous statute in
a way that was inconsistent with this Court's own, earlier reading of the law." (citing Brand X, 545
U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring))).
185. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712 (2011)
("[W]e have found it immaterial to our analysis that a 'regulation was prompted by litigation."'
(quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996))).
186. See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2011),
af'id, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
187. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) ("[A] 'longstanding principle of
judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the neces-
sity of deciding them."' (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445
(1988))).
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retroactivity issue sufficiently addressed by its prior instruction that
whether an agency interpretation was induced by litigation is immaterial
to the deference analysis. However, these are insufficient bases for Su-
preme Court silence when lower courts require direction.188
Like Home Concrete's confusion of ambiguity, its silence on Brand
X's applicability to the Supreme Court and to retroactive litigation-
induced regulations creates more questions than it answers. And like the
ambiguity issue, these will leave lower courts, agencies, and affected
individuals in legal limbo.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court made great leaps forward in administrative-
deference law with Chevron, wisely abandoning the unpredictable case-
by-case approach of Skidmore for a general presumption that courts
should defer to agency interpretations. While giving agencies a predicta-
ble grant of flexibility in administration of their respective bodies of law,
Chevron reserved appropriate judicial standards to prevent abuse of
agency discretion. Brand X appropriately extended Chevron deference to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes that had already been inter-
preted by courts, thus preventing an anomalous race for authority be-
tween courts and agencies.
Home Concrete errantly reached a Brand X analysis by undervalu-
ing congressional changes to the tax code. Through misapplication of
Brand X, Home Concrete's plurality damaged the test for Brand X ap-
plicability and casted doubt on Chevron's clear meaning of "ambiguous."
The Court also stirred controversy into several open issues of administra-
tive-deference law by ignoring them without explanation. Considering
the Court's flawed reasoning and missed opportunities, Home Concrete
was wrongly decided and signaled an unwise retreat from Chevron's
deferential doctrine.
W Matthew Pierce*
188. See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 985-86 (referring to need for Supreme Court to resolve "genuine
confusion in the lower courts" even when resolution is not "logically necessary").
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